Quashing of FIRs: Emergent Trends Before the Supreme Court

Introduction

The First Information Report (FIR) is the starting point of the criminal process in India. Its significance is such that once registered, it sets the machinery of investigation in motion. Yet, not all FIRs merits a trial. Many are lodged with ulterior motives, often as tools of harassment or as a counterblast to civil disputes. To balance individual liberty with the interests of justice, the Supreme Court has established guidelines for quashing of FIRs under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) or, in suitable cases, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Over the years, the Court has moved beyond a rigid “prima facie” reading of FIRs, and now, in emergent jurisprudence, encourages courts to read the FIR in its context, and, in suitable cases, to “read in between the lines.” This change attempts to prevent the misuse of criminal law as a weapon in private disputes, while ensuring that genuine offences are not stifled prematurely.

Statutory and Constitutional Framework

The statutory framework is clear. Section 482 of the CrPC preserved the inherent powers of the High Courts to pass orders to “prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” This has been carried forward into Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023. In addition, under Article 226 High Courts have the authority to issue extraordinary writs, which have occasionally been invoked to quash FIRs. However, the Supreme Court has clarified that once a Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence, writ jurisdiction is ordinarily unavailable, and the proper course of action is to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. In Pardnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948, the Court underlined this procedural distinction, holding that petitions filed post-cognizance must specifically plead and annex the cognizance order, and cannot simply be filed under Article 226.

The Classical Framework: Bhajan Lal

The foundational jurisprudence on quashing stems from State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, where the Supreme Court laid down seven illustrative categories in which the inherent powers to quash may be exercised. These included the following scenarios:-

• (a) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
• (b) Where the allegation in the First Information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under section 156(1) of the code expect under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
• (c) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
• (d) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of Code.
• (e) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
• (f) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the code or the concerned Act to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is specific precision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
• (g) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

The above seven categories in which the inherent powers to quash may be exercised, though merely illustrative, continue to be cited as the bedrock of quashing doctrine. These classifications influenced a largely prima facie approach for decades, in which courts were reluctant to step in if the FIR seemed to reveal the elements of an offense.

Judicial Caution in Neeharika

This restraint was reinforced in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, where the Supreme Court cautioned that High Courts should not consider evidence or decide contentious factual issues at the threshold. The Court underlined that quashing must continue to be an exception and that the informant’s mala fides are typically secondary. However, the court recognized that the purpose of extraordinary jurisdiction is to prevent abuse of process, leaving open the possibility of intervention in clear cases of misuse.

The Contextual Turn in Mahmood Ali

The turning point came with Mahmood Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 10 SCC 544, where a Division Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and J.B. Pardiwala held that in cases where mala fides or abuse are alleged, the High Court has a duty to examine the FIR with greater care and may even “read in between the lines.” The Court explained that when the larger circumstances strongly imply ulterior motives, a textual analysis alone is insufficient. As a result, courts have the authority to consider the entirety of the dispute, the complaint's timing, the existence of concurrent civil proceedings, and even a small number of materials gathered during the investigation, as long as they exercise appropriate caution. This ruling is significant because it broadens the scope of contextual scrutiny in order to reveal covert abuse, rather than using a limited "prima facie" filter.

Reinforcement in Mamida Reddy and Naushey Ali

The principle in Mahmood Ali was reaffirmed in Mamida Anil Kumar Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 812, where the Court quashed criminal proceedings that arose out of a property dispute, observing that giving a criminal colour to civil disputes amounts to an abuse of process. Similarly, in Naushey Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1652, the Court quashed an FIR where Section 307 IPC had been mechanically invoked, stressing that “mere mention of a penal section” is insufficient if the factual allegations do not support the ingredients of that offence.

Retaliation and Counterblast FIRs: Ahluwalia

The Supreme Court has also addressed the delicate balance between private liberty and public interest. In Nitin Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab & Anr., 2025 INSC 1128 (decided on 18 September 2025), the Court quashed an FIR under Section 498-A IPC filed by a wife after adverse decrees in foreign courts relating to divorce and custody. The Court found that the FIR was a counterblast and its continuation would constitute abuse of process. The Bench, comprising Justices B.R. Gavai and K. Vinod Chandran, explicitly emphasized the timing of the FIR and the surrounding matrimonial litigation, treating these as clear markers of mala fide intent.

Vagueness and Omnibus Allegations: Sanjay Jain

In Sanjay D. Jain & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 1168 (decided on 26 September 2025), the Supreme Court reiterated that vague or omnibus allegations under Section 498-A IPC cannot sustain continuation of proceedings. The Court quashed the FIR against in-laws, observing that the absence of specific acts, dates, or roles amounts to an abuse of process.

Civil Disputes as Crime: XYZ v. State of M.P.

In XYZ v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 INSC 1143 (decided on 24 September 2025), the Supreme Court again corrected a High Court order that had refused quashing but directed partial repayment and mediation in a financial dispute. The Court held categorically that civil debts cannot be enforced through criminal process, and that the High Court had exceeded its role by engaging in “settlement engineering” under Section 482.

Two-Layered Test for Quashing

The aforementioned cases illustrate how the Court's jurisprudence have developed into a two-tiered test. Initially, courts are required to implement the classical Bhajan Lal criteria: if the allegations within the FIR are taken as true, do they indicate a criminal offense? If they do not, the case should be dismissed. Secondly, when there are credible claims of abuse, courts must incorporate a contextual aspect that examines factors such as delays, repeated complaints, the civil nature of the dispute, or any documentary evidence that outright contradicts the claims.

Discipline for High Courts

For High Courts, this requires careful discipline. They must begin by identifying whether cognizance has been taken; if it has, the appropriate course of action is Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 / 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. They must then apply the Bhajan Lal test, dismissing cases that do not reveal an offence or are prohibited by law. In situations involving allegations of mala fides, they need to look beyond the text of the FIR and take into account the surrounding circumstances.

Doctrinal Takeaways

The doctrinal takeaways are clear. Bhajan Lal outlines the categories, Neeharika emphasizes restraint, and Mahmood Ali authorizes contextual scrutiny. Nitin Ahluwalia and XYZ v. State of M.P. demonstrate how this evolved test operates in practice. The common thread among these decisions is that criminal proceedings must not themselves become a punishment, and that inherent jurisdiction safeguards both liberty and justice.

Conclusion

The jurisprudence today is more complex than ever. It no longer stops at asking whether the FIR discloses a cognizable offence. It asks whether the FIR, in its context, is genuine or an abuse. This means looking at timing, background disputes, multiplicity, and documentary evidence. It entails stepping in when criminal law is weaponized in civil matters, while refraining from interference in serious public offenses. The Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence thus draws a careful balance: be restrained, but not mechanical; be vigilant, but not intrusive.